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JUDICIAL NOTICE IN FEDERAL CRJhIINAL
PROCEDURE
LESTER B. ORFIELD*
I. INTRODUCTION
IN approaching any study of federal criminal evidence, it is immediately
apparent that criminal trials are enormously expensive in terms of
time, energy and money. A recent examination of over twenty-eight
hundred cases dealing with this subject1 reveals that where resort can
be had to judicial notice,2 some relief may emerge2 Hence, just what
is understood to be within the scope of this doctrine is of the utmost
importance if the fruits of its application are to be realized.
A current decision' of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
indicates that the canonical words of Dean WigmoreP still are regarded
as the beacons of truth in this shadowy area of the law:
That a matter is judicially noticed means merely that it is taken as true w:ithout
the offering of evidence by the party who should ordinarily have done so. This is
because the Court asszmies that the matter is so notorious that it will not be dis-
puted. But the opponent is not prevented fron. disputing the wattcr by evidence,
if he believes it disputable.6
But, while language couched in such general terms avoids the pitfall of
inconsistent specificity, it aids the practitioner little-his primary con-
cern being the procedure and particular rule involved in an individual
* Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law.
1. The author, adopting the plan of Professor Morgan, has thought it fitting to com-
mence with the topic of Judicial Notice. See Morgan, Some Problems of Proof Under the
Anglo-American System of Litigation (1956). But see McCormich, Evidence (1954), where
it is dealt with as the last topic in evidence.
2. "'Judicial notice or knowledge may be defined as the cognizance of certain facts which
judges and jurors may, under the rules of legal procedure or otherwise, properly take and
act upon without proof because they already know them.' United States v. Hammer:, 241
Fed. 542, 543 (S.D. Fla. 1917). See also Beadnell v. United States, 303 F.2d 37, S9 (9th Cir.
1962).
3. See generally McCormick, Evidence §§ 323-31 (1954) ; Mfodel Code of Evidence rules
SO1-05 (1942); Underhill, Criminal Evidence §§ 60-70 (4th ed. 1935); Uniform Rules of
Evidence 9-12; 1 Wharton, Criminal Evidence §§ 34-S5 (12th ed. 1955); 9 Wigmore,
Evidence §§ 2565-S3 (3d ed. 1940); Slovenko, Establishing the Guilt of the Aciutsed,
31 Tul. L. Rev. 173, 177 (1956).
4. United States v. Grady, 225 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1955).
5. See 9 Wigmore, Evidence § 2567 (3d ed. 1940). Compare McCormick, Evidence § 330,
at 710 (1954); Morgan, Judicial Notice, 57 Harv. L. Rev. 269, 273-S7 (1944).
6. 225 F.2d at 416-17. See also Garner v. Louisiana, 363 US. 157, 194-96 (1961); United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 14S F.2d 416, 446 (2d Cir. 1945); State v. Duranlmau,
99 N.H. 30, 104 A.2d 519 (1954); Davis, Judicial Notice, 55 Colum. L. Rev. 945, 978-S2
(1955); Annot., 45 A.L.R.2d 1169, 1172 (1956).
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situation. For example,, a court may take judicial notice without appli-
cation by either party.' A trial judge in his instructions may comment
on matters of which judicial notice may be taken where the comment is
applicable to the subject matter.' Yet, a state court in a prosecution
for grand larceny of an automobile held that it was reversible error for
the trial judge judicially to notice that the automobile was worth more
than fifty dollars, the statutory minimum for grand larceny, and then to
instruct the jury that if the defendant was guilty, he was guilty of
grand larceny.9
II. MATTERS OF LAW
In ascertaining the facts of which judges are bound to take judicial
notice, as in the decision concerning matters of law, they may refresh
their memory and inform themselves from sources which they deem most
trustworthy.' ° As to the existence of a statute, or the date when it took
effect, they may consult the original roll or other official records. With
respect to international affairs, they may inquire of the State Department.
Judicial notice is taken of amendments to the United States Consti-
tution," of federal statutes,12 and of federal executive and departmental
regulations. 3 In one case, judicial notice was taken of the regulations
of the Secretary of Agriculture but not of those of the Bureau of Animal
7. In Green v. United States, 176 F.2d 541 (1st Cir. 1949), the court noticed a postal
regulation and stated that "we are not aware of any authority for the proposition that a
court cannot if it wishes take judicial notice sua sponte of any matter proper for it to
notice." Id. at 544. See McCormick, Evidence § 330, at 708 (1954). But see 9 Wigmore,
Evidence § 2568 (3d ed. 1940).
8. Lake v. United States, 302 F.2d 452, 454 (8th Cir. 1962).
9. State v. Lawrence, 120 Utah 323, 234 P.2d 600 (1951), 32 B.U.L. Rev. 115 (1952).
See also United States v. Wilson, 284 F.2d 407 (4th Cir. 1960) (reaching a similar result as
to judicial notice of value).
10. Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202, 216 (1890). See a'so McCormick, Evidence
§ 326, at 694 (1954).
11. Judicial notice has been taken to the effect that the twenty-first amendment repealed
the eighteenth amendment, United States v. Chambers, 291 U.S. 217, 222 (1934) ; and also
that the purpose of the twenty-first amendment was to repeal the eighteenth amendment,
United States v. Colorado Wholesale Wine & Liquor Dealers Ass'n, 47 F. Supp. 160, 162
(D. Colo. 1942).
12. Beadnell v. United States, 303 F.2d 87, 89 (9th Cir. 1962) ; Leonard v. United States,
18 F.2d 208, 212 (6th Cir. 1927) ; Marrash v. United States, 168 Fed. 225, 230 (2d Cir, 1909).
13. Thornton v. United States, 271 U.S. 414, 420 (1926) ; Caha v. United States, 152 U.S.
211, 221 (1894) ; United States v. Grady, 225 F.2d 410, 415 (7th Cir. 1955) ; United States
v. Bradford, 160 F.2d 729, 731 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 829 (1947); Nurnberger
v. United States, 156 Fed. 721, 730 (8th Cir. 1907) ; Wilkins v. United States, 96 Fed. 837,
841 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 175 U.S. 727 (1899); In re Quirk, 1 F.2d 484, 486 (W.D.N.Y.
1924); United States v. Moody, 164 Fed. 269, 275 (W.D. Mich. 1908).
JUDICIAL NOTICE
Husbandry. 14 On the other hand, regulations of the Secretary of War1 5
proclamations of the President16 and regulations of the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue1 7 have all been noticed. The Supreme Court took
judicial notice of a decision of the Director of Selective Service rendered
on an appeal pursuant to the Selective Service Act of 1949.16 Amend-
ments to regulations will also be judicially noticed under the express
provisions of the statute providing for the Federal Registere9 and under
judicial precedents.2" Ioreover, it has been held that a court of appeals
may take judicial notice of the legislative history of a federal statute2I
and a ration order need not be introduced in evidence when the court's
instructions summarize it for the jury. -2 2
It would seem that the trial court not only may, but must take judicial
notice of domestic statutes. In a civil case it was held that a party may
be precluded on appeal from complaining of the trial judge's failure to
notice a statute where his counsel has failed to call it to the judge's
attention." In a subsequent decision, the Supreme Court reversed for
failure to notice a rule of the Interstate Commerce Commission, although
the rule was not called to the attention of the trial court.2 4 The latter
seems to be the better approach. -5
Rule 7(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides in
part:
The indictment or information shall state for each count the official or customary
citation of the statute, rule, regulation or other provision of law which the defendant
14. United States v. Rohe & Bro., 213 Fed. 182, 184 (S.).Y. 1914). The court gave
no reasons.
15. United States v. Casey, 247 Fed. 362, 363-64 (S.D. Ohio 191S).
16. Armstrong v. United States, SO U.S. (13 Wall.) 154, 156 (1371); Merritt v. United
States, 264 Fed. S70, S73 (9th Cir. 1920), rev'd on other grounds, 255 U.S. 579 (1921);
Krichman v. United States, 263 Fed. 53S, 544 (2d Cir. 1920), rev'd on other ground, 256
U.S. 363 (1921).
17. United States v. Monarch Distrib. Co., 116 F.2d 11, 13 (7th Cir. 1940), cert. denied,
312 U.S. 695 (1941).
18. Bowles v. United States, 319 U.S. 33, 35 (1943).
19. 49 Stat. 502 (1935), 44 U.S.C. § 307 (195S). "The contents of the Federal Reg-ister
are judicially noticed and may be cited by volume and page number." Kempe v. United
States, 151 F.2d 6S0, 684 (Sth Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 331 US. S43 (1947).
20. United States v. Lutz, 142 F.2d 985, 9S9 (3d Cir. 1944).
21. Flippin v. United States, 121 F.2d 742, 744 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 US. 677
(1941); Dolloff v. United States, 121 F.2d 157, 159 (Sth Cir.), cert. denied, 314 US. 626
(1941).
22. United States v. Stefanowicz, 81 F. Supp. 974 (E.D. Pa.), rev'd on other grounds, 177
F.2d 189 (3d Cir. 1949).
23. Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Glenwood Irr. Co., 265 Fed. 594, 597 (8th Cir. 1920).
24. Lilly v. Grand Trunk W.R.R., 317 U.S. 481, 488 (1943).
25. McCormick, Evidence § 326, at 695-96, § 330, at 703 (1954); Comment, 30 Yale
LJ. 855 (1921).
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is alleged therein to have violated. Error in the citation or its omission shall not be
ground for dismissal of the indictment or information or for reversal of a conviction
if the error or omission did not mislead the defendant to his prejudice.20
But the rule does not expressly provide against taking judicial notice
of the statute, and as a result there have been virtually no reversals
because of a violation of the rule.21 Thus, in effect, as before the adoption
of the rule,28 judicial notice is taken of the statute.
When an indictment makes reference to laws of the state in which the
federal court sits, the court will take judicial notice of such statutes."
When there is no state constitutional provision or statute, the federal
court may judicially notice the common law as to a sheriff's duties. 0
In one case, judicial notice has even been taken of a city ordinance
regulating the sale of live poultry.0"
Judicial notice is not taken of foreign law, since foreign law is "a
question of fact to be proved by the government.13 2 Judicial notice,
however, is taken of the rules of international law.13 The inviolability
of diplomatic correspondence has been so noticed, 4 as have been United
States treaties.3 5
26. Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c).
27. Orfield, Indictment and Information in Federal Criminal Procedure, 13 Syracuse
L. Rev. 389, 404-05 (1962).
28. Orfield, Indictment and Information in Federal Criminal Prosecution, 13 Syracuse
L. Rev. 218, 245-47 (1961).
29. Jelke v. United States, 255 Fed. 264, 287 (7th Cir. 1918); United States v. Quinn,
27 Fed. Cas. 673, 680 (No. 16110) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1870). See Moore v. United States, 2 F.2d
839, 842 (7th Cir. 1924), cert. denied, 267 U.S. 599 (1925); Thornton v. United States,
2 F.2d 561, 562 (5th Cir. 1924), aff'd, 271 U.S. 414 (1926); United States v. Sutter, 127
F. Supp. 109, 118 (S.D. Cal. 1954); United States v. Chaplin, 54 F. Supp, 926, 927 (S.D.
Cal. 1944).
30. Catlette v. United States, 132 F.2d 902, 906 (4th Cir. 1943).
31. United States v. A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp., 76 F.2d 617, 623 (2d Cir.), rev'd
on other grounds, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
32. United States v. Luvisch, 17 F.2d 200, 202 (E.D. Mich. 1927) (counterfeiting
Canadian excise stamps). In United States v. Lutwak, 195 F.2d 748, 761-62 (7th Cir. 1952),
the court indulged in the bold presumption that the French law as to the validity of
"immigration marriages" is the same as that of Illinois. In affirming the case, the majority
of the Supreme Court did not pass on the point, 344 U.S. 604 (1953), but the three dis-
senters disapproved the unrealistic presumption. 344 U.S. at 621 (dissenting opinion).
33. McCormick, Evidence § 326, at 700 (1954). See also Skirlotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69,
72-73 (1941); The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 708 (1900).
34. Viereck v. United States, 139 F.2d 847, 850 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 794
(1944).
35. United States v. Spector, 102 F. Supp. 75, 83 (S.D. Cal. 1951), rev'd on other grounds,
193 F.2d 1002 (9th Cir. 1952).
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III. FACTS RELATING TO THE PERSONNEL, OPERATION AND
RECORDS OF THE COURT
The court takes judicial notice of the power of its clerk, e.g., the
power to administer oaths.3 " A court of appeals has judicially noticed
that at the time of a trial Congress had not appropriated any money to
pay court reporters37 and, hence, a criminal trial could proceed without
a reporter.
Limited concepts of judicial notice as to public officers have been
laid down by all courts.38 But a district court need not take judicial
notice of what officers are the officers of another district court, even if
they are in the same circuit. 2 It need not notice the signatures of the
United States Attorney of another federal district or of another federal
circuit."0 This strained reasoning was employed to invalidate Rule 20
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure on transfer for a plea of
guilty. In another case in which the trial judge had improperly repri-
manded counsel for the defendant, the court of appeals judicially noticed
that such counsel "is a reputable attorney of high standing," and a
former Assistant United States Attorney.4'
A court of appeals will take judicial notice of whether at the time a
grand jury was impanelled and returned indictments, both the district
courts and the circuit courts were in session, and as to who were the
presiding judges and clerks thereof. 2 A court notices that all courts
and court proceedings in England are public,*3 and that districts are
usually divided into divisions.44
Judicial notice is taken that there are United States commissioners
at named places within the federal district; 2 that a United States com-
missioner had competent authority to administer the oath to the de-
fendant in a perjury prosecution;" and that all proceedings before the
36. United States v. Bickford, 168 F.2d 26, 27 (9th Cir. 1943). The court aho cited the
statute on powers of the clerk. Id. at 27.
37. Ricard v. United States, 14S F.2d S95 (Sth Cir. 1945).
38. McCormick, Evidence § 323, at 703 (1954).
39. Petition of lundorff, S F.R.D. 7, 3 (D. Ore. 195S).
40. Ibid.
41. Kraft v. United States, 238 F.2d 794, SOD (Sth Cir. 1956).
42. Ledbetter v. United States, 03 Fed. 52, 54 (5th Cir. 1901). Accord, Gordon v. United
States, 1 F.2d 531 (Sth Cir. 1927).
43. Hartzell v. United States, 72 F.2d 569, 5S0 (Sth Cir.), cert. denied, 293 US. 621
(1934).
44. Morris v. United States, 128 F.2d 912, 915 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 661
(1942).
45. United States v. Gross, 159 F. Supp. 316, 31S (D. Nev. 1953).
46. In Barnard v United States, 162 Fed. 61S, 624 (9th Cir. 1903), the court held that
the indictment was not defective for failure to aIlege the commissioner's authority to ad-
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commissioner as to issuance of a search warrant are in the district court
in a prosecution for unlawful possession of liquor."
The trial judge, in considering a plea in abatement to an indictment
for an omission of the clerk in drawing the grand jury, will take judicial
notice of the record relative to the duty which it is claimed the clerk
failed to perform.4" It will also take judicial notice that a grand jury
was publicly drawn in the presence of the officials required to be
present,49 and that there has been no order of the district court limit-
ing the authority of any judge over the grand jury and its continued
session during a succeeding term.50 A court, however, will not judicially
notice that Negroes have been excluded from the grand jury."' A trial
judge in the District of Columbia took judicial notice that names of
jurors are picked at random from the city directory by the jury com-
missioners in such a way as to obtain the needed number. 52 A court
notices that the grand jury when convened and impanelled was properly
sworn in and instructed in its duties as disclosed in the minutes of the
grand jury.5 3 The court may also judicially notice the sessions of the
grand jury within the district. 4
In one case, a trial judge, in sentencing, took judicial notice of grand
jury investigations in state and federal courts involving the defendant
and also that the United States Attorney had been directed to secure
indictments and institute contempt proceedings which might involve the
defendant.55 In another case, in imposing a light sentence, the court
took notice that in areas well back from the west coast, Japanese who
are well disposed are permitted to be at large while others are under
guard.56 A court of appeals may take judicial notice that a sentence,
imposed by a state court upon the expiration of which a federal sentence
was to begin, was not for violation of a federal statute.57 Following a
plea of nolo contendere, a court took judicial notice that the defendant
minister the oath on which the perjury was based. Accord, Link v. United States, 2 F.2d
709 (6th Cir. 1924).
47. United States v. Casino, 286 Fed. 976, 978 (S.D.N.Y. 1923) (dictum).
48. United States v. Greene, 113 Fed. 683, 691 (S.D. Ga. 1902), cert. denied, 207 U.S.
596 (1907); United States v. Lewis, 192 Fed. 633, 636 (E.D. Mo. 1911).
49. 113 Fed. at 694.
50. United States v. Malone, 18 F. Supp. 865, 868 (N.D. Ill. 1937).
51. McKenzie v. United States, 126 F.2d 533, 534 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
52. United States v. Fields, 6 F.R.D. 203, 205 (D.D.C. 1946), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 851
(1948).
53. United States v. Agnew, 6 F.R.D. 566, 567 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
54. Zacher v. United States, 227 F.2d 219, 225 (8th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S.
993 (1956). See White v. United States, 216 F.2d 1, 4 (5th Cir. 1954) (dictum).
55. United States v. Pendergast, 28 F. Supp. 601, 612 (W.D. Mo. 1939).
56. United States v. Minoru Yasui, 51 F. Supp. 234 (D. Ore. 1943).
57. Dryden v. United States, 139 F.2d 487 (8th Cir. 1944).
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corporation had a corps of experts who keep abreast of government
regulations1 s
In general, a court will judicially notice its own records in the same
case. On application to the trial judge for allowance of an appeal, stay
of proceedings and printing of the record for appeal, the trial judge
may notice that the defendant was tendered a jury trial at his arraign-
ment, and that under advice of counsel of his own selection, he volun-
tarily pleaded guilty."2 A court has taken judicial notice from the
counts of an indictment that the same offense "is charged in them all,
and that the conviction on one of the counts subjects the defendant to
the same punishment as a conviction on all of them."
0l.)
A court of appeals will take judicial notice of its own records in a
case,' but a district court need not notice prior litigation in the same
court, such as a prior criminal trial. - Nor will a court of appeals take
judicial notice of prior litigation unless proof thereof appears in the
record. Where reference has been made in the record to other indict-
ments against the defendant, a court of appeals will take judicial notice
of such indictments. 3 On a plea of double jeopardy a court may notice
its own records and also compare indictments.04 In a criminal contempt
proceeding the court may judicially notice the proceedings, files and
records in the original case out of which the contempt proceeding arose,
In an appeal from denial of the writ of error coram nobis, a court of
appeals may take judicial notice of its records in the original appeal
58. United States v. Weirton Steel Co., 62 F. Supp. 961, 962 (N.D. W. Va. 1945).
59. United States v. Wright, 224 Fed. 2S5 (N.D.N.Y. 1915). On judicial notice of records
of the court see mcCormick, Evidence § 327 (1954); Morgan, Maguire & Weinstein,
Evidence 26 (4th ed. 1957); 1 Wharton, Criminal Evidence § 63 (12th ed. 1955); 9 Wig-
more, Evidence § 2579 (3d ed. 1940).
60. United States v. Keen, 26 Fed. Cas. 686, 693 (No. 15510) (C.C.D. Ind. 1839).
61. Weber v. United States, 104 F.2d 300 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 303 U.S.
590 (1939). In an early court of appeals case it was said: "While judicial kmowledge does
not extend to the record or proceedings in former or other cases, it does extend to the record
and proceedings in the case on trial." Withaup v. United States, 127 Fed. 530, 536 (Sth Cir.
1903). See also Winslow v. United States, 216 F.2d 912, 914 n.2 (9th Cir. 1954); Fletcher V.
United States, 174 F.2d 373, 376 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 33S U.S. 851 (1949); Hood v.
United States, 152 Fa2d 431, 433 (Sth Cir. 1946). But in a later case the same court held that it
could take judicial notice of the record in another, but interrelated case. Norris v. United
States, S6 F2d 379, 331 (8th Cir. 1936), rev'd on other grounds, 30O U.S. 564 (1937).
62. Walker v. United States, 113 F.2d 314, 318 (9th Cir. 1940); Benetti v. United States,
97 F.2d 263, 266 (9th Cir. 1938).
63. United States v. Krepper, 159 F.2d 953, 968 (3d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 US.
824 (1947).
64. United States v. Halbrook, 36 F. Supp. 345, 346 (ED. Mo. 1941).
65. O'Ialley v. United States, 123 F.2d 676, 6S7 (Sth Cir. 1942), rev'd on other grounds,
317 U.S. 412 (1943); Oates v. United States, 233 Fed. 201, 2C6 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
242 U.S. 633 (1916); Schwartz v. United States, 217 Fed. 866, 870 (4th Cir. 1914).
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from the conviction.6" On a motion to vacate a conviction, a district
court may notice habeas corpus proceedings in a different federal court
in which a similar contention was made. 7 On appeal from a judgment
denying defendant's motion to vacate a judgment of conviction and
sentence which on a prior appeal had been partly affirmed, a court of
appeals will notice that the defendant had unsuccessfully sought release
from custody in two habeas corpus proceedings."' Moreover, a federal
trial judge may judicially notice the opinion of the chief judge of the
district court in a prior prosecution in which the codefendants were
found guilty.69
The federal district court can take judicial notice to some extent of
the proceedings before the commissioner in the same criminal proceed-
ing. Rule 5(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
After concluding the proceeding the commissioner shall transmit forthwith to the
clerk of the district court all papers in the proceeding and any bail taken by him. 70
A court of appeals has stated that it construed this rule "to permit the
district court to take judicial notice of the proceedings before the com-
missioner on preliminary examination which have been transmitted to
the clerk of the district court."' But if in fact the papers have not
been so transmitted at the time of the trial, then they are not a part
of the record on which the court can rely.
72
IV. OTHER GOVERNMENTAL FACTS
If a pardon is by public statute or presidential proclamation, the
court must take judicial notice of it.73  But an individual pardon by
the President must be pleaded in bar by motion, plea or otherwise.7' In
one of the earliest decisions involving judicial notice, after citing the
views of Blackstone, Mr. Chief Justice Marshall stated:
66. Wiley v. United States, 144 F.2d 707 (9th Cir. 1944).
67. Hood v. United States, 152 F.2d 431, 435 (8th Cir. 1946).
68. Wells v. United States, 158 F.2d 833 (5th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 852
(1947).
69. United States v. Austrew, 202 F. Supp. 816, 821 (D. Md. 1962). The court cited
McCormick. Evidence § at 695 (1954).
70. Fed. R. Crim. P. 5(c).
71. White v. United States, 216 F.2d 1, 4 (5th Cir. 1954). See Pollock v. United States,
202 F.2d 281, 282 (5th Cir. 1953); see also Orfield, Proceedings Before the Commissioner In
Federal Criminal Procedure, 19 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 489, 564 (1958).
72. White v. United States, 216 F.2d 1, 7-8 (5th Cir. 1954).
73. Armstrong v. United States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 154, 156 (1871); United States v.
Richards, 91 F. Supp. 323 (D.D.C. 1950); In re Greathouse, 10 Fed. Cas. 1057, 1059 (No.
5741) (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1864).
74. United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150, 161 (1833); Miller v. United States,
41 App. D.C. 52, 61 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 231 U.S. 755 (1913). See Orfield, Pleadings and
Motions Before Trial in Federal Criminal Procedure, 29 Fordham L. Rev. 1, 23-24 (1960).
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The reason why a court must ex officio take notice of a pardon by act of Parliament,
is that it is considered as public law; having the same effect on the case as if the
general law punishing the offense had been repealed or annulled. 5
Judicial notice will be taken that the United States is at war,70 and
of a joint resolution of Congress declaring war.77 Judicial notice has also
been taken that the President terminated hostilities in World War II on
December 31, 1 9 4 67 S and of the existence of a "cold war" after World
War II. 9
The courts are bound to take judicial notice of the territorial extent
of the jurisdiction exercised by the government whose laws they ad-
minister, or of its recognition or denial of the sovereignty of a foreign
power, as appearing from the public acts of the legislature and executive,
although those acts are not formally put in evidence nor in accord with
the pleadings.8 0 Judicial notice should be taken of the legislative and
executive attitude towards a new government in connection with a
civil war.s8
The federal courts take judicial notice "of the territorial extent of
the general government, the local divisions of the country, its geography,
its natural water courses, and of the boundaries of the same."62 They will,
therefore, judicially notice that a seagoing vessel carrying immigrants
from France to the United States did not find a port of entry within
the Northern District of Illinois. 3 Judicial notice has been taken of
facts which vest the United States with exclusive jurisdiction over the
place of the offense; 8 4 of federal jurisdiction as to murder on an Indian
reservation; s that a bawdy house at a certain address is less than five
miles from a military post;8" and of the boundaries of an Indian reserva-
tion in the district.8 7
75. United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150, 163 (1833).
76. Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 53, 587 (1919); Sonnenberg v. United States,
264 Fed. 327 (9th Cir. 1920).
77. Stephens v. United States, 261 Fed. 590, 591 (9th Cir. 1919).
78. United States v. Jaffe, 9S F. Supp. 191, 197 (D.D.C. 1951).
79. Gara v. United States, 17S F.2d 33, 41 (6th Cir. 1949), aff'd per curiam, 340 U.S.
857 (1950).
80. Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202, 214 (1890).
81. United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610, 634-35, 643 (1813).
82. Ex parte Lair, 177 Fed. 789, 794 (D. Kan. 1910). See also Weaver v. United States,
29S F.2d 496, 499 (5th Cir. 1962); Campbell v. United States, 221 Fed. 186, 18-&9 (9th
Cir. 1915); United States v. Carrillo, 13 F. Supp. 121, 122 (S.D. Cal. 1935).
83. Ex parte Lair, 177 Fed. at 795.
84. Brown v. United States, 257 Fed. 46, 49 (Sth Cir. 1919), rev'd on other grounds,
256 U.S. 335 (1921). Compare Schoppel v. United States, 270 F.2d 413, 41S (4th Cir. 1959).
85. United States v. Black Spotted Horse, 282 Fed. 349, 351 (DS.D. 1922). See also
Azure v. United States, 24S F.2d 335, 337 (8th Cir. 1957).
86. Anzine v. United States, 260 Fed. 827, 829 (9th Cir. 1919).
87. Phelps v. United States, 160 F.2d 626, 627 (9th Cir. 1947).
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Judicial notice will be taken that the State of Oregon is a representa-
tive and judicial district of the United States; 88 and that a particular
city or place is in a certain federal district and division. 89 Judicial
notice, however, is not taken that streets referred to in evidence are in
any certain town,9" but notice may be taken of the location of certain
streets in a city.91
The incumbent of various public offices is judicially noticed, e.g., the
Commissioner of Patents, the office of Post Office Inspector12 and
assistants to the Secretary of Labor.13 Judicial notice is taken that the
Federal Works Agency is not a subdivision of the Treasury;04 that
farmers serving on Triple A Townships committees do not receive
compensation for their services; 91 that a witness fee is four dollars and
transportation allowance is seven cents per mile in the District of
Columbia;96 that the Director of the Bureau of Prisons has contracted
for the use of certain state jails in the district, and that his directives
allow temporary use of unapproved jails. A district judge, on motion
to vacate, will judicially notice the record of the Department of Justice
as to actions of the Federal Parole Board before whom the defendant
appeared. 8
Judicial notice has been taken of the signature of the President on
a trust patent.99 Thus, where the word "Bonaparte" was signed to a
telegram refusing a commutation of sentence, the court noticed that he
was the United States Attorney General, Charles J. Bonaparte. 100 More-
88. United States v. Johnson, 26 Fed. Cas. 630, 631 (No. 15488) (D. Ore. 1873).
89. Dean v. United States, 246 F.2d 335, 338 (8th Cir. 1957); United States v. Jones,
174 F.2d 746, 749 (7th Cir. 1949); Herman v. United States, 48 F.2d 479 (5th Cir. 1931);
Portman v. United States, 34 F.2d 406, 407 (8th Cir. 1929); Duree v. United States, 297
Fed. 70, 71 (8th Cir. 1924); Goldstein v. United States, 256 Fed. 813 (7th Cir. 1919);
Bradley v. United States, 254 Fed. 289, 291 (8th Cir. 1918) ; United States v. Anderson, 60
F. Supp. 649, 650 (W.D. Wash. 1945), rev'd on other grounds, 328 U.S. 699 (1946) ; United
States v. Tait, 6 F.2d 942 (S.D. Ala. 1925).
90. United States v. Jones, 174 F.2d 746, 749 (7th Cir. 1949).
91. Weaver v. United States, 298 F.2d 496, 499 (5th Cir. 1962).
92. Carroll v. United States, 16 F.2d 951, 955 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 763 (1927).
See also Dropps v. United States, 34 F.2d 15, 17 (8th Cir. 1929), cert. denied, 281 U.S. 720
(1930).
93. United States ex rel. Petach v. Phelps, 40 F.2d 500 (2d Cir. 1930).
94. United States v. MacEvoy, 58 F. Supp. 83, 86 (D.N.J. 1944).
95. Kempe v. United States, 160 F.2d 406, 409 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 843
(1947).
96. United States v. Richardson, 113 F. Supp. 423, 425 (D.D.C. 1953).
97. In re Morgan, 80 F. Supp. 810, 816-17 (N.D. Iowa 1948).
98. United States v. Von Der Heide, 169 F. Supp. 560, 564 (D.D.C. 1959).
99. Estes v. United States, 225 Fed. 980 (8th Cir. 1915).
100. Perovich v. Perry, 167 Fed. 789 (9th Cir. 1909).
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over, a federal court may take judicial notice of an investigation con-
ducted by a state legislative committee.10'
V. MISCELLANEOUS FACTS
Judicial notice is taken of matters of common knowledge. It has
been held that the common knowledge concept may be extended to
knowledge common to those in a particular trade. Thus, the maritime
practice of making up manifests from bills of lading has been judicially
noticed. 1 2 But judicial notice will not be taken of the practice of a
steamship contractor, engaged in transporting cargo, in keeping a delivery
record book."0 3 It is common knowledge that numbers on an automobile
are a ready method of identification and that changing numbers is a
common expedient for concealing its ownership. 14 On a prosecution for
counterfeiting United States coins, the court and the jury will take judi-
cial notice that there are genuine coins, for example fifty cent pieces
and twenty-five cent pieces.'1 5 In an income tax prosecution the trial
judge took judicial notice of the general practice of corporations as to
deductions for business entertainment.""" It is common knowledge of
which judicial notice will be taken that a brokerage account is not
considered closed as long as funds remain on the books of the broker
to the credit of the customer." It is also common knowledge that
peace officers find it helpful in the detection of crime to know as much
as possible about known criminals and their associates, and thus, sys-
tems of registration are devised for that purpose.0 s On the retrial of
an important criminal case, judicial notice was taken of public prejudice
warranting a change of venue."'9 In granting a plea of abatement to an
indictment against an attorney, the court took "judicial notice of the
crushing effect of losing one's reputation .... ,'ll A court of appeals has
also stated that it "may take judicial notice of the fact that many an
accused person on trial is found to be not guilty.'
The courts will take judicial notice of historical facts such as the
101. United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 405 (1927).
102. United States v. Rappy, 157 F.2d 964, 966 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S.
306 (1947). Compare McCormick, Evidence § 324 (1954).
103. United States v. Rappy, 157 F.2d at 966.
104. Donaldson v. United States, 32 F.2d 6S0, 681 (7th Cir. 1936).
105. United States v. Burns, 24 Fed. Cas. 1313, 1315 (No. 14691) (C.C.D. Ohio 1'49).
106. United States v. Bridell, ISO F. Supp. 26S, 279 (N.D. IlI. 1960).
107. Smith v. United States, 169 F.2d 113, 122 (6th Cir. 1943).
10S. Smiley v. United States, 131 F.2d 505, 507 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 317
(1950).
109. United States v. Hoyt, 7 Alaska 276, 2S0 (1925).
110. United States v. Garvett, 35 F. Supp. 644, 647 (E.D. Mlich. 1940).
111. Isaacs v. United States, 256 F.2d 654, 661 (8th Cir. 1958).
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history of the building trades in an antitrust prosecution." In one case
it was judicially noticed that Sir Francis Drake died in 1596."1 In a
prosecution for using the mail to defraud, a court noticed that in the
fall of 1928 many prominent businessmen and learned economists
believed that the very prosperous business condition was permanently
established." 4 A court of appeals judicially noticed "that the National
Socialists are followers of Hitler, and that the notorious German Library
of Information was an agency for the dissemination of Hitler's propa-
ganda in this country.""' Notice was taken that the Mormon Church
for many years advocated polygamy and used the mails to disseminate
its literature." 6 Judicial notice has been taken that the Communist
Party is controlled by the party heads in the Soviet Union;11 7 and that
it seeks to obtain control of key labor unions in the United States in
order to obtain control over the general economy." 8 In a prosecution
for violation of the Smith Act, a court judicially noticed that the times
and world conditions were such that there existed the "clear and present
danger" necessary to the validity of the statute."0
The courts will judicially notice that beer is a fermented liquor,
chiefly made of malt. 20 Facts of chemistry contained in the United
States Pharmacopoeia will also be judicially noticed.12' Thus, the
Government need not prove that cocaine is a derivative of coca leaves,
or that heroin and morphine are salts of opium.' 22 Judicial notice is
taken that opium is not commercially a domestic product;123 and that
whisky is intoxicating and fit for beverage purposes. 24 Hence, knowl-
112. United States v. Alexander & Reid Co., 280 Fed. 924 (S.D.N.Y. 1922).
113. Hartzell v. United States, 72 F.2d 569, 580 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 621
(1934).
114. Greenbaum v. United States, 80 F.2d 113, 118 (9th Cir. 1935).
115. United States v. Wernecke, 138 F.2d 561, 565 (7th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S.
771 (1944).
116. United States v. Barlow, 56 F. Supp. 795, 797 (D. Utah 1944).
117. Eisler v. United States, 176 F.2d 21, 24 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 958
(1949).
118. United States v. Flaxer, 112 F. Supp. 669, 672 (D.D.C. 1953). See generally on
judicial notice as to issues involving Communism: Note, Judicial Notice and the Com-
munist Party, 29 Notre Dame Law. 97 (1953); Note, Federal Anti-Subversive Legislatlon
of 1954, 55 Colum. L. Rev. 631, 711 (1955).
119. United States v. Mesarosh, 13 F.R.D. 180, 187 (W.D. Pa. 1952).
120. United States v. Ducournau, 54 Fed. 138 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1891).
121. Melanson v. United States, 256 Fed. 783, 786 (5th Cir. 1919).
122. Id. at 785-86.
123. United States v. Yee Fing, 222 Fed. 154, 156 (D. Mont. 1915).
124. United States v. Golden, 1 F.2d 543, 547 (D. Minn. 1923); United States v.
Percansky, 298 Fed. 991, 995 (D. Minn. 1923).
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edge of a liquor offense may be acquired through the sense of smell.125
In one case, however, the court stated
there was no evidence, expert or othervise, to the effect that the use of morphine
affects the credibility of a witness; and, if it be true that its use does have such an
effect, that fact is not so generally true that courts vwould be varranted in taking
judicial notice of it.- 6
A court will judicially notice that identification by fingerprints is
about the surest method known, and that it is universally used in the
detection of criminals.1 7 Judicial notice was taken of the maximum
and minimum temperatures in the District of Columbia on a certain
date;12s that 3.2 per cent by weight and four per cent by volume, when
applied to alcoholic contents of beverages, are the same, 120 and that
eggs have a peculiar propensity for the acquisition of odors from many
and varied sources. 13" Notice is taken that "smoking opium" is not a
remedy sold as a medicine;' 3' that sugar has many uses other than
food; 32 that illegal drugs commonly originate in foreign countries;'
and that illicit drug vendors make great profits.131 Moreover, judicial
notice has been taken that motion picture films are of a highly in-
flammable nature; 3 ' and that sea water is impregnated with gold.'-"
An appellate court has even taken judicial notice that a search warrant
served at Baton Rouge at about 7:30 p.m. on April 4, 1931 was served
at "nighttime," the sun having set at 6:25 p.m. according to official
records.3
Judicial notice is taken of facts of common knowledge as to roads and
highways. 35 Distances between points may be of such general knowl-
edge as to warrant taking judicial notice. Thus, judicial notice has been
125. De Pater v. United States, 34 F.2d 275, 276 (4th Cir. 1929).
126. Weaver v. United States, 111 F.2d 603, 606 (Sth Cir. 1940).
127. Piquett v. United States, 81 F.2d 75, S1 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 664 (1936).
128. AMcAffee v. United States, 111 F.2d 199, 203 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
129. Robason v. United States, 122 F.2d 991, 992 (10th Cir. 1941).
130. United States v. Commercial Creamery Co., 43 F. Supp. 714, 717 (E.D. Wash. 1942).
131. Chin Gum v. United States, 149 F.2d 575, 577 (1st Cir. 1945); Ng Sing v. United
States, 8 F.2d 919, 922 (9th Cir. 1925).
132. United States v. Grunenwald, 66 F. Supp. 223, 227 (W.D. Pa. 1946).
133. Reyes v. United States, 253 F.2d 774 (9th Cir. 195S); Garcia v. United Stat3, 250
F.2d 930, 932 (10th Cir. 1957); United States v. Bologna, 131 F. Supp. 705, 703 (S.D. Cal.
1960); United States v. Eramdjian, 155 F. Supp. 914, 91S (S.D. Cal. 1957).
134. Silverman v. United States, 59 F.2d 636, 633 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 640
(1932).
135. United States v. Milson, 23 F.2d 112, 113 (N.D. IV. Va. 1927).
136. Little v. United States, 73 F.2d 861, 367 (10th Cir. 1934).
137. Distefano v. United States, 58 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1932).
133. United States v. Holz, 103 F. Supp. 191, 196 (E.D. Ill. 1950).
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taken of the distance from Washington, D.C. to various cities.' On
the suggestion of the Government, a trial judge took judicial notice
that United States Highway No. 101 is the main thoroughfare between
Mexico and Los Angeles, running within one mile of the Pacific Ocean
at certain points.' Notice has also been taken of the distance between
California cities and the Mexican border.' 4 '
Judicial notice is taken of the meaning of words or terms in common
usage such as "insect powder."' 42 In one case, a court judicially noticed
the meaning of bank stamps on the backs of checks.'43 On the other
hand, a court will not take judicial notice that a particular bank is a
federal reserve bank or member bank, and the indictment itself must
show this fact.'44 Nor will judicial notice be taken that home brew is
intoxicating. 45 On appeal, a court of appeals will not judicially notice a
newspaper which was not put in evidence, even though the defendant
claims jurors read the newspaper. 46
A trial judge need not take judicial notice of facts claimed by the de-
fendant as to the probability of identification of a voice. 47 Before filing
a mandatory instruction that such was the fact, the judge would need
to find that the fact could not fairly be disputed. 48 In a prosecution for
receiving indecent books, it was held that the trial judge should not have
taken judicial notice that the store of the defendant was located in a
prostitution area, but the error was not prejudicial since the matter was
not relevant. 40 The court offered two reasons for not taking judicial
notice: (1) the fact was not a matter of common and general knowledge;
and (2) it was not well and authoritatively settled, but was doubtful and
uncertain.' 50 A court of appeals cannot take judicial notice that the value
139. United States v. Richardson, 113 F. Supp. 423, 425 (D.D.C. 1953).
140. United States v. Hortze, 179 F. Supp. 913, 915 (S.D. Cal. 1959).
141. United States v. Orejel-Tejeda, 194 F. Supp. 140, 141 (N.D. Cal. 1961).
142. Parke, Davis & Co. v. United States, 255 Fed. 933, 935 (5th Cir. 1919).
143. United States v. McKay, 45 F. Supp. 1001, 1005-06 (E.D. Mich. 1942).
144. United States v. Dooley, 11 F.2d 428 (E.D.N.Y. 1926). See Garner v. Louisiana,
368 U.S. 157, 193-96 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring).
145. Keen v. United States, 11 F.2d 260, 262 (8th Cir. 1926) ("intoxicating liquor"
within National Prohibition Act of 1919, ch. 85, tit. II § 2, 41 Stat. 307-08). In United
States v. Tot, 36 F. Supp. 273 (D.NJ. 1941), the court, faced with the question of taking
judicial notice of the technical operation of firearms, stated: "It is obvious that this Court
cannot take judicial knowledge of the technical operation of firearms which permits some of
them to be equipped with silencers or mufflers and prevents others from being so equipped."
Id. at 274-75.
146. Gicinto v. United States, 212 F.2d 8, 11 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 884 (1954).
147. United States v. Moia, 251 F.2d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1958).
148. Id. at 258. The court cited 9 Wigmore, Evidence § 2568a (3d ed. 1940).
149. Alexander v. United States, 271 F.2d 140, 143-44 (8th Cir. 1959).
150. Ibid.
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of seventy-two rifles stolen from an armory was more than one hundred
dollars, since the degree of the offense depended on the value. i
A trial judge, in refusing to grant a severance, declined to take judicial
notice that another defendant might sign a confession which would pos-
sibly not be admissible against the defendantY2 In the first place, there
was presently no evidence of any such confession, and secondly, the
court could instruct the jury as to its admissibility.1"
VI. LEGISLATIVE FACTS
In certain cases legislative facts are to be presented to the court."
Such facts may be social, economic, political, or scientific, and the ques-
tion often arises how such facts are to be presented. The Supreme Court,
in referring to this problem, has stated that:
Where the existence of a rational basis for legislation 'whose constitutionality is
attacked depends upon facts beyond the sphere of judicial notice, such facts may
properly be made the subject of judicial inquiry . . . and the constitutionality of a
statute predicated upon the existence of a particular state of facts may be challenged
by showing to the court that those facts have ceased to exist.1'
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia abandoned the
M'Naghten test of sanity because it "is inadequate in that (a) it does
not take sufficient account of psychic realities and scientific knowledge,
and (b) it is based upon one symptom and so cannot validly be applied
in all circumstances." '  The court acted without support in the evidence
developed at the trial, but did not consider whether the facts outside
the record of which it was taking judicial notice were disputable. In cases
where the validity of a statute is attacked for want of due process, the
court must often ascertain whether Congress had reasonable grounds for
believing that social facts support the statute.' 7 On this issue, the court
may consider such data as the reports of legislative committees.1 3
VII. CONCLUSION
The federal courts should make greater use of judicial notice than
they presently do in order to accelerate the normally slow trial pro-
151. United States v. nrhlSon, 284 F.2d 407, 403 (4th Cir. 1960).
152. United States v. Boyance, 30 F.R.D. 146, 143 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
153. Ibid.
154. McCormick, Evidence § 329, at 705 (1954).
155. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 (193S).
156. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 874 (D.C. Cir. 1954). See disca.'ion of the
case by Davis, judicial Notice, 55 Colum. L. Rev. 945, 953-54 (1955); Mlorgan, Maguire
& Weinstein, Evidence 12-14 (4th ed. 1957).
157. Carolene Prods. Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 18, 31 (1944).
158. Id. at 23.
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cedure. 159 This could be accomplished by judicially noticing facts which
are, at the time of trial, so notoriously true as to be incontrovertible in
the community, and by resorting more frequently to available sources of
indisputable accuracy. In those rare cases where there are pretrial pro-
ceedings, this would be especially true. In criminal proceedings, judicial
notice could be employed at every stage so as to eliminate issues about
which there can be no bona fide dispute.
However, one area where perhaps orthodox rules of judicial notice
should not be applied is where the indictment or information fails to
cite the statute making the conduct a criminal offense. If employed here,
there is the possibility of unnecessary unfairness to the defendant, since
the orthodox rule may, to a large extent, make Rule 7(c) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure a dead letter. 6 ' In such cases the burden
to cite the statute should be on the Government.
It would seem that a court is justified in making use of judicial notice
in civil cases on the same principles as in criminal cases, and that notice
to the parties that it is being utilized is often unnecessary.' 0 ' In a recent
case,' 62 Mr. Justice Harlan pointed out that while procedurally it may be
preferable to announce to the parties that the court is taking judicial
notice, this prerogative should be within the reasonable discretion of the
trial judge as to routine matters of common knowledge.0 3 Finally, if the
Supreme Court lays down rules of evidence, full account should be taken
of the work already done in this area by the American Law Institute in
its Model Code of Evidence'04 and in the Uniform Rules of Evidence.'Y
159. This approach is advocated by a number of authorities in the field of evidence.
See McCormick, Evidence § 324, at 689 (1954); Morgan, Some Problems of Proof Under
the Anglo-American System of Litigation 69 (1956); 9 Wigiore, Evidence § 2583, at 585
(3d ed. 1940).
160. See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
161. See, e.g., Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 194 (1961).
162. Garner v. Louisiana, supra note 161.
163. Id. at 194. This view is supported in McCormick, Evidence § 330, at 708 (1954);
Morgan, Some Problems of Proof Under the Anglo-American System of Litigation 48-59
(1956).
164. The Supreme Court should note the Model Code of Evidence rules 801-06.
165. Uniform Rules of Evidence 9-12 should also be considered in drawing up the
Federal Rules of Evidence.
